Polygon’s 8 million USDT0 holders face scrutiny as 58% of growth matches scam patterns
An investigation by Bitquery reveals that 58% of the net increase in Polygon's USDT0 user base since August 2025 stems from suspected address-poisoning scams, complicating network growth metrics.
A recent surge in Polygon’s USDT0 holder numbers conceals declining balances and suspected fraudulent activity, complicating the network’s ongoing expansion into stablecoin payments.
An investigation published on Oct. 7 by blockchain analysis firm Bitquery revealed that addresses exhibiting scam-like traits represented 58% of the net increase in Polygon’s USDT0 user base since August 2025. This casts doubt on the validity of adoption metrics previously highlighted by the network.
These conclusions directly question Polygon’s recent milestones, where it boasted of crossing 8.1 million USDT0 holder addresses—the leading figure among all networks evaluated in a comparison by Token Terminal.
Bitquery reported that nearly 998,000 out of the 1.71 million wallets incorporated over the prior 13 months displayed characteristics typical of address-poisoning schemes.
This expansion occurred alongside a 41% drop in the overall USDT0 supply on Polygon, sliding from $1.35 billion down to $798 million. Additionally, wallets maintaining a balance of at least $10 dropped by 42%, falling from roughly 1.24 million to 720,000.
Bitquery’s data indicated that 48% of these holders possessed less than a single cent, and 65% had neither transferred nor acquired the token over the preceding 12 months.
Furthermore, the analysis uncovered roughly 1.42 million wallets displaying traits of address poisoning, with sample-based checks pointing to an estimated 1.1 million fraudulent look-alike addresses.
Address poisoning is a tactic where malicious actors generate wallet identifiers mimicking trusted transaction destinations, dispatching micro-transactions to prospective targets in the hope they will accidentally copy the fake destination during future transfers.
Because these accounts often hold tiny, fractional token amounts, they register as active holders. Bitquery noted that its categorization relied on probability models and did not measure actual financial losses stemming from the suspected fraud.
The discoveries follow Polygon’s transition in August 2025 from bridged USDT to native USDT0, a process that maintained legacy token amounts and smart contract locations. Approximately 67% of present holders initially acquired Tether ahead of that network update.
Polygon’s payments ambitions face a measurement problem
These insights emerge as Polygon actively markets itself as a hub for stablecoin transactions, vying to attract payment gateways, large-scale institutional liquidity, and cross-border settlement solutions.
This push has run parallel to a notable rise in network activity.
Metrics from blockchain data provider Growthepie recently highlighted that Polygon handled a higher volume of peer-to-peer stablecoin transfers over a week-long period than the Ethereum mainnet, and surpassed the combined totals of Base and Arbitrum.
Stablecoin cards enter ‘hyper growth’ mode as monthly spending hits record $1.17 billion
While this measurement excludes decentralized finance smart contracts, automated operations—including address-poisoning tactics—can still inflate transaction totals.
At the same time, metrics from DeFiLlama indicate that Polygon maintains roughly $2.93 billion in total stablecoin reserves, with Circle’s USDC making up $1.62 billion, or 55.29% of that sector.
Tether stands as the ecosystem’s second-biggest stablecoin, boasting a supply of roughly $795 million, which accounts for about 27% of the aggregate volume.
Such data implies that Polygon’s wider stablecoin ecosystem has evolved independently from Tether’s contracting liquidity pool, though Bitquery’s findings leave open whether authentic USDT0 transactional volume has actually dropped.
?Frequently Asked Questions
01What is an address-poisoning scam?
Address poisoning occurs when scammers send tiny, dust amounts of cryptocurrency to a user’s wallet from an address that looks very similar to one the user frequently interacts with. The goal is for the user to mistakenly copy and paste the fake address from their transaction history during a future transfer.
02Why did Polygon’s USDT0 holder count appear so high?
The high holder count was heavily inflated by automated scam addresses (such as those tied to address poisoning) that retained fractional token balances, allowing them to be counted as active holders despite having zero genuine human utility.
03Does this affect all stablecoins on Polygon?
The investigation specifically focused on USDT0 holders and supply dynamics. Other stablecoins on the network, such as Circle’s USDC, operate independently and maintain different distribution metrics.



