November 17, 2026
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US deposit rates choke USDC adoption, and a BIS model reveals why

A Bank for International Settlements research paper shows that rising US bank deposit rates slow USDC adoption more than USDT adoption, highlighting how traditional banking yields compete directly with stablecoins.

US deposit rates choke USDC adoption, and a BIS model reveals why

A research paper issued by the Bank for International Settlements on Oct. 13 connects bank deposit repricing to a more significant estimated slowdown in USDC expansion than in USDT expansion, showing how bank offerings can affect stablecoin adoption differently depending on the issuer.

Higher deposit rates offer holders a more compelling financial incentive to retain funds within traditional banking institutions. According to the study, a one-basis-point increase in deposit rates corresponded to roughly 4.8% less cumulative USDC growth over a ten-week period, in contrast to a 1.9% reduction in growth for USDT.

Researchers Rashad Ahmed and Iñaki Aldasoro relied on weekly data spanning from January 2019 through June 2025. The BIS released the October iteration following an initial version published on March 24, with the earlier abstract already highlighting the more pronounced USDC reaction.

Trading platforms can supply variable incentives to qualifying users, introducing another layer of price competition for capital. This dynamic makes the historical issuer distinction valuable for predicting adoption trends while leaving contemporary comparisons between banks and platforms open for future definition.

How the issuer estimates compare

The study’s deposit-rate metric calculates an average across six national savings and money-market deposit account series. This metric differs from the Federal Reserve’s benchmark policy rate and from yields on specific high-yield accounts.

The ten-week OLS point estimates highlight the divergence between the two issuers:

Stablecoin Estimated change in cumulative log market-cap growth per 1 basis point of deposit repricing
USDC −4.8 percentage points
USDT −1.9 percentage points

Ordinary least squares (OLS) serves as the core statistical framework, whereas the negative estimates reflect slower growth rates relative to the baseline trajectory.

The authors view the sharper reaction from USDC as consistent with its closer ties to US institutional participants and decentralized finance participants. Such holders may be more inclined to weigh bank deposits against stablecoin holdings, while linking USDT’s milder reaction to its prevalence in offshore and developing-economy markets.

Because the dataset cannot track which specific holders shifted funds or identify the exact bank accounts involved, the issuer explanation remains an interpretation of the observed patterns.

When forecasting adoption, the takeaway is that applying a single deposit-rate assumption across all stablecoins can mask varying competitive pressures. The point estimates point to a stronger connection between US deposit pricing and USDC within this specific sample, without locking in a fixed reaction for either token across every economic climate.

Looking at stablecoins overall, the baseline ten-week estimate indicates roughly 2.8% less cumulative growth per basis point of deposit repricing. An alternative model utilizing an instrumental-variable methodology designed to isolate deposit repricing yields a larger estimate of approximately 9.1% less growth.

This alternative approach leverages banks’ heightened pass-through of policy rate adjustments when the federal funds target midpoint four weeks prior stood at 3.125% or higher. It relies on this resulting variability to influence stablecoin demand via deposit repricing after accounting for other variables.

The incorporated controls account for monetary policy and Treasury yields, Bitcoin pricing, the US dollar index, and market volatility, helping isolate deposit-price competition from wider market conditions without proving the underlying identification assumption.

The researchers point out instrument weakness, noting that the first-stage F-statistic sits at 9.78, which falls short of the conventional threshold of 10 they reference. With only a single high-interest-rate window present in the data, the larger estimate lacks robust evidence to justify applying it to a different rate cycle.

Within the instrumental-variable charts of the paper, the 95% confidence band for USDC over ten weeks remains strictly below zero, whereas the band for USDT spans zero.

A separate examination of deposit tiers reinforces the direction of this relationship by leveraging variations in how financial institutions reprice preferred money market and savings vehicles.

Control tests accounting for the Silicon Valley Bank collapse, broader crypto market events, trading volumes, and DeFi yields continue to show negative relationships. Responses among balances provided to lending protocols remain less precise. While the data supports the presence of competition, the exact scale relies heavily on the chosen model and sample.

Rewards change what holders compare

The returns generated by a stablecoin balance are also influenced by the platform hosting the funds. In a bulletin issued on June 19, the BIS outlined two distinct economic frameworks governing exchange payouts to stablecoin holders.

Under reserve-based remuneration, a trading platform passes along a portion of the earnings generated by the issuer’s underlying reserve assets to the holders. Under activity-based remuneration, disbursements are linked directly to lending, trading, and auxiliary market participation.

The publication uses Coinbase and Binance as primary illustrations, though it notes that these categories feature fuzzy boundaries.

Reviewing historical exchange yield metrics, Coinbase’s USDC holding yield tracked policy and reserve yields much more closely, whereas Binance’s yields showed greater sensitivity to crypto market activity. These represent fundamentally different methods for funding balance returns, each driven by distinct catalysts.

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Coinbase’s active reward policies characterize USDC Rewards as a loyalty initiative financed by the platform itself, operating without utilizing or lending out customer USDC holdings without explicit instructions.

Additionally, Coinbase mandates that participants reside in permitted jurisdictions, maintain trading eligibility, and hold a minimum balance of $1 in USDC. Its FAQ guidelines also necessitate a Coinbase One subscription across several regions, including the United States and the United Kingdom.

Yields differ by nation, account category, and ongoing platform testing, and Coinbase retains the right to alter or terminate the program. The official FAQ directs individuals toward account-specific percentages and does not establish a single annual percentage yield (APY) accessible to every USDC owner.

Such conditions complicate direct comparisons with traditional bank accounts. The true return depends heavily on the individual user and specific offer, alongside any membership expenses and variations in risk profile. Coinbase emphasizes that USDC balances maintained on its platform do not constitute deposit accounts and are excluded from FDIC or SIPC protections.

Platform incentives were already active during portions of the study’s timeframe, and the working paper acknowledges third-party returns while factoring in a DeFi-yield control within its robustness testing.

That control does not quantify current Coinbase membership prerequisites or the reward spreads offered by every individual exchange. Native issuer interest, exchange-backed rewards, and returns derived from token lending remain distinctly separate mechanisms.

Demand competition leaves the lending question open

The authors of the working paper note that stablecoin reserves ultimately get reinvested, potentially shifting deposits across institutions and depositor categories based on the issuer’s banking partners.

The routing of reserves and the breakdown of depositors could influence bank funding expenses. The current demand metrics target a separate stage of this mechanism: how stablecoin balances react to the yields banks provide to depositors.

A stronger reaction observed in USDC cannot be directly translated into a specific metric for lost traditional bank lending. Doing so would necessitate additional insights regarding where reserves ultimately land, how financial institutions offset replacement funding, and how they adjust their credit underwriting.

Although the research models responses to shifts in deposit yields, its coefficients cannot be plugged straight into a Federal Reserve interest rate adjustment because bank repricing dynamics and the returns accessible across various platforms function as distinct inputs.

A practical forecasting tool would need to differentiate between issuers, the geographic locations and behaviors of their user bases, bank repricing strategies, and availability of exchange incentives. Updated empirical evidence connecting issuer expansion with actual bank-versus-platform returns available to comparable participants will be vital to determine how far this historical relationship persists into upcoming phases of adoption.

Frequently Asked Questions

01What did the BIS study reveal about USDC and USDT growth?

The study found that bank deposit repricing links to a larger estimated slowdown in USDC growth compared to USDT growth. Specifically, a one-basis-point increase in deposit rates was associated with 4.8% less cumulative USDC growth over ten weeks, versus 1.9% less growth for USDT.

02Why do USDC and USDT respond differently to deposit rates?

Researchers interpret USDC’s larger response as a result of its stronger connections to US institutional and decentralized finance users who are more likely to compare bank deposits with stablecoin balances. USDT’s weaker response is associated with its heavier use in offshore and developing economies.

03Are exchange rewards considered part of traditional bank deposits?

No. Exchange rewards and platform yields are distinct mechanisms. Platforms like Coinbase explicitly state that stablecoin balances on their platforms are not deposit accounts and do not carry FDIC or SIPC insurance.

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